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ONE KOREA

WHAT U.N. MUST DO ON KOREAN QUESTION

ROK Refugees Struggle
for International Status

ROK-Japan Talks
Sinister Aims

No. **15**

Sept. – Oct. 1962

Our Aims and Demands

Liberation from Japanese Imperialism did not bring complete freedom and independence to Korea. Instead, the Big Powers of the world split the Korean territory and nation into two countries. And to this day, the Korean people have been suffering for sixteen long years under the most piteous and distressing conditions. Not only have we constantly wandered on the brinks of death, pressed by poverty and oppression, but we at last had to commit the most shameful mistake in our history: Incited by foreign powers, we Koreans engaged ourselves in the horrible task of killing our own brothers during that tragical Korean War. Yet, in spite of all these sufferings and injustices, the Korean people obediently held trust in the good faiths of the Big Powers, and solely believed that they would carve out the future of Korea for us.

But today we have finally realized our stupidity. We know well now that we must carve out our own destiny with our own hands, that is, the Korean nation must realize unification of Korea by the nation's own powers if it is willing to live. And the people's uprising in April last year which overthrew that most atrocious government of all times, the Syngman Rhee regime, without borrowing any aid from others, has given us the confidence that we can accomplish this aspiration.

We, as members of the Korean nation and campaigners for the unification movement, urged by such consciousness and confidence, propose here that our Independent and Peaceful Unification shall commence by conducting mutual contact and exchange between the North and South Korean people. Whereby, we are sure, brotherly love will be renewed and North and South negotiations invited; thus enabling concrete plans for unification to be worked out. We also believe that the unification must be not only the unification of the Korean territories but also of the divided nation. And in order to reflect the true will of the entire nation on the unification, we call for a Free General Elections to be held throughout North and South Korea; and through these elections, a Unified Central Government shall be established. From these standpoints, we demand:

- 1) To immediately open up exchanges of letters, civilian travel, culture and trade between North and South Korea.
- 2) To convene at once an All-Korea Conference represented by delegates from the Governments, political parties and civil organizations of both Koreas, to study and work out the measures for preparing the All-Korea General Elections and establishing the Unified Central Government.

We are convinced that these demands are fully legitimate, equitable and just since they are based on the standpoints of humanity, fundamental rights and the principle of self-determination. Still we cannot ignore the bearings which the Korean Unification problem has on the international relations. Thus emphasizing the original mission of the United Nations; respecting the authority of the 1954 Geneva Conference in which both the North and South Korean Delegations had participated, and acknowledging adoption of the Agreements reached at the said Conference, we request the nations concerned:

- 1) To call as soon as possible an International Conference that shall further the accomplishments of the Political Conference on the Korean Question held at Geneva in 1954, and accelerate the Korean unification by assisting the independent unification movements of the Korean people.

Besides those nations which participated in the 1954 Conference, delegations from the four nations constituting the Korean Armistice Observation Commission (Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia) and India shall participate in the proposed Conference.

- 2) All nations participating in this International Conference shall assume the responsibility to secure the peace in the Korean Peninsula and to guarantee the peaceful development of Unified Korea.

In order to secure these guarantees, the United States, the Soviet Union and all other countries shall immediately stop supplying weapons and all other military aids to the present Governments of North and South Korea; shall pledge to assist in the reconstruction of Korea on conditions of non-intervention in her internal affairs and also not to utilize Unified Korea as military bases; and shall recommend immediate membership of Unified Korea to the United Nations.

- 3) The same nations shall also support, when requested, the projects of the Unification Projects Agency which will be established by the All-Korea Conference, and also set up an International Supervision Commission to supervise the All-Korea General Elections which will be administered by the above Agency.

The International Supervision Commission shall be formed by nations that did not participate in the Korean War, but elected by the participating nations in the proposed International Conference and confirmed by the United Nations.

- 4) The foreign armed forces stationed in Korea shall be replaced by International Police Forces and evacuate Korea as soon as possible.

The International Police Forces shall be organized by troops from nations that did not participate in the Korean War; shall have missions to maintain the peace in Korea and also to secure an atmosphere in which free and fair elections can be enforced; and shall withdraw from Korea when requested by the Unified Korea Government.

Unification of Korea is a matter of life and death to the Korean people. No one, no nation should be allowed to bar our way. Therefore, we here appeal to the world to understand and to extend its support to our aims and demands.

ONE KOREA

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UNIFICATION MOVEMENTS

Oct. 1, 1962

No. 15

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Change in United Nations

The Korean Question which is nearly old as the United Nations itself will again be debated by the General Assembly that opened its 17th session on Sept. 18. To our regrets, however, there are no changes to be seen in the positions of the United States or Soviet Russia on the Question and thus a breakthrough to solution of the long-pending issue is hopeless.

There will be a Soviet draft resolution demanding withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from South Korea along with a U.S. proposal presented under the title of "1962 Report of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK)" before the Assembly this year. It is the first time that such Soviet request comes up in the Assembly agenda but the point has been requested many times before to no avail. And as 11 UNCURK reports have been presented to and approved by the Assembly before, nothing new will come out of the U.S. resolution either.

Now why should the U.S. and Soviet Russia always raise issues apparently conflicting to the solution of the Korean Question? This is because these two powers have forgotten their real duties towards the U.N. so much so that they have come to consider the U.N. as a tool to pursue their own national interests.

The U.N. of today, however, is no longer a world body to be monopolized by the Big Powers. The structure of the U.N. is undergoing a great change due to the increase in its membership of newly born nations, whereby the organization is being requested to transform into a body truly dedicated to build a new world order based on the principles of peace, equality and self-determination to all nations.

It would, however, be a very difficult work to reform the United Nations in that direction. Some Big Powers are still ill-using the United Nations and barring resolution of such vital issues as the Korean Question. They are also raising voices critical to the equal voting rights of small member countries. Such voices and maneuvers are but the last flounders by the Big Powers. The hope of the world is the smaller member nations of the U.N. who shall work to reform the U.N. in the direction to build a new world order.

WHAT U.N. MUST DO TO SETTLE KOREAN QUESTION

The United Nations has spent 15 fruitless years on the Korea Question. The issue, ill-used by the Big Powers, has become so distorted and entangled that settlement by the U.N. seems hardly possible. But recent change in the world body provides a speck of hope towards settlement. A review of the past history of the Korean Question in the U.N. is done in this article to find a breakthrough to solution of this long-pending Question.

I Foreword

15 years have passed since the Korean Question was submitted to the United Nations and it will be the 16th time that the General Assembly will discuss the issue. The Korean Question is the oldest unsolved problem in the United Nations and for the time being there seems no hope of settlement being reached on the Question during the current 17th session.

Now, why must the Korean Question be left unsolved forever tied, as it is, to the United Nations? Nobody would dare say that it must be so, for an early resolu-

tion of the issue is not only wanted by the Korean nation but is also absolutely necessary to uphold the prestige of the United Nations.

Then, in what way should the Korean Question be handled by the United Nations hereafter? What measures should the United Nations contrive so as to reach a swift settlement on the Question? Before answering these queries, it is necessary to trace the past history of the Korean Question in the United Nations.

II 15 years of U.S. versus Soviet Rivalry

Temporary Commission and Set-up of ROK Government. The Korean Question was first taken up by the General Assembly in its 2nd session that convened in Sept. 1947. Till then the issue of Korean independence was being negotiated by the U.S.—Soviet Joint Commission. Reaching a stalemate with the Russians, the United States presented the issue to the General Assembly which adopted a resolution on No. 14, 1947 establishing the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea as the U.N. body “to observe the elections to set up a national government of Korea.” (General Assembly resolution 112).

The Temporary Commission was immediately sent to enforce the general elections under its supervision but was

refused entrance into North Korea by Soviet Russia which had opposed the establishment of the Temporary Commission on ground that it was established by an Assembly without participation of Korean representatives. So, after consultation with the Interim Committee (Little Assembly), the Temporary Commission enforced general elections only in South Korea on May 10, 1948 which brought about the establishment of the Republic of Korea on Aug. 15 of that year.

Recognition of ROK Government. The 3rd session of the General Assembly which opened in Sept. 1948, overriding Communist opposition, accepted the report submitted by the Temporary Commission and declared that the ROK Government established in South Korea

in accords with the General Assembly resolution was "based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission" and the only "lawful government" having "effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside." (General Assembly resolution 195). In place of the Temporary Commission, the General Assembly set up the U.N. Commission on Korea which was given the tasks to (a) bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korea security forces; (b) facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea; (c) be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people and (d) observe the actual withdrawal of the occupying forces and verify the fact of withdrawal. And to execute these tasks, the Commission was authorized to travel, consult and observe throughout Korea and also consult with the Interim Committee.

The Commission, however, was hardly able to carry out its assignments except that it confirmed the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Korea in June 1949 which was a half year later than the Soviet withdrawal from North Korea. So, all that it could report to the General Assembly was that antagonistic actions between North and South Korea were rendering the realization of Korean unification ever remote.

Reflecting the threatening situation in Korea reported by the Commission, a heated debate developed between the American and Soviet delegates in the Special Political Committee of the 4th General Assembly session, over the issue of inviting Korean representatives and

the continuance of the U.N. Commission on Korea. U.S. draft resolutions overrode Soviet proposals and the U.N. Commission on Korea, approved to continue, was given an additional mission to "observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea."

Korean War and UNCURK. In spite of the new mission assigned to the U.N. Commission on Korea by the General Assembly, war broke out in Korea only a half year later on June 15, 1950. The Security Council was immediately called up and in the aperture of Soviet absence from the Council in connection with the issue of Chinese representation, the Council resolved to despatch the United Nations Force to Korea constituted by units of 16 Western Nations under U.S. command.

The 5th General Assembly held in the autumn of that year adopted the so-called Korean Peace Resolution (General Assembly resolution 376) on Oct. 7 which resolved to recommend "all appropriate steps to be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea" and the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) which inherited the work of the U.N. Commission on Korea, was entrusted to "exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council."

Armistice and Geneva Political Conference. During the following three years of the Korean War, the General Assembly received annual reports from the UNCURK and worked to bring about termination of the hostilities. But armistice of the Korean War was not realized within the framework of the United Nations. It was brought about through direct negotiations between the belligerent parties and signed on July 27, 1953.

Nevertheless, the General Assembly not only expressed approval of the Armistice

Agreement through its resolution (General Assembly resolution 711) adopted on Aug. 28, but also welcomed the convening of a political conference by the nations concerned to seek peaceful settlement of the Korean Unification Question. The Geneva Political Conference on Korea reached agreements on many points at issue, but the United Nations countries unilaterally declared adjournment of the conference despite insistence by the Communist nations to continue the conference until ultimate settlement of the Korean Question.

The United Nations countries then submitted a report (Nov. 11) to the U.N. Secretary General and requested the General Assembly to carry on further discussions on the Korean Question. This report contradictory to the Armistice Agreement and the General Assembly resolution of Aug. 28, 1954 that supported the Agreement, was confirmed by the

General Assembly in its resolution of Dec. 11, 1954 (General Assembly resolution 811) and the Korean Question was returned to the discretion of the United Nations.

Stalemate. During the subsequent seven years, the Korean Question was discussed throughout the six sessions of the General Assembly, but each time the East and West powers just repeated their same old arguments and when it came to voting, the UNCURK reports were always approved and its work was given endorsement to be continued.

The discussions were limited to procedural matters such as the issue of inviting Korean representatives and they hardly went into the substance of the the Question. The last session is a good example of the way in which the Korean Question has been treated by the General Assembly.

III Empty Debates of the 16th GA Session

3 Drafts on Korean Invitation. The General Committee held at the beginning of the 16th session (Sept. 21, 1961), unanimously approved including the Korean Question in the agenda and sent it to the Political Committee for discussion. The Political Committee began its discussion on the Korean Question in its morning meeting of Dec. 12. There were already three draft resolutions on inviting Korean representatives before the Committee.

Other Mongolia proposed that both North and South Korean representatives be invited to participate in the Korean debate. The United States requested inviting only South Korea and Greece and Thailand put forth an amendment on the Mongolian draft resolution asking invitation of North Korean representatives also on condition that Pyongyang recognized the authority and competence of the United Nations in dealing with the Korean Question.

The chairman of the Political Committee (Mario Amadeo of Argentina) ruled that the Committee should first clear the issue of which Korea to invite before going into the discussion on the substance of the Question. But once the Committee got down to decide on the invitation, the arguments became so widely diverted that settlement seemed impossible. Australia and Nationalist China supported the U.S. proposal; while Soviet Russia, Rumania and Indonesia expressed support for the Mongolian draft resolution and Netherlands endorsed the Greece-Thailand proposal.

In the afternoon meeting, Great Britain, the Philippines, New Zealand, France, Turkey and Japan expressed support for the Greece-Thailand amendment; whereas Albania, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia and White Russia came in support for the Mongolian draft and the discussion was carried over into the following day.

Invitation to Both Koreas. In the morning meeting of Dec. 13, the U.S. delegate took the floor and withdrawing the U.S. proposal, came around to express support for the Greece-Thailand amendment followed by Dahome and Canada. Against this move, India, Iraq, Poland, Cuba, Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia backed the Mongolian proposal. Finally, the draft resolutions were put to vote and the Greece-Thailand amendment was adopted by a vote of 63 to 19 with 3 absent.

Following the votes, Chairman Amadeo ruled the Committee to invite the South Korean delegate into the meeting, but was immediately opposed by the Soviet delegate who demanded that both Korean representatives should be invited at the same time.

In the evening meeting, the Committee after discussion on disarmament, moved to enter debate on the Korean Question but the Soviet delegate put in a motion censuring the Chairman's ruling to invite the South Korean delegation, whereby time ran out and debate on the Korean Question was postponed till a later meeting.

Speech by ROK Delegate. The Committee's morning meeting on Dec. 14 was scheduled to discuss the Algerian issue, but the U.S. delegate motioned to hear the South Korean delegate speak. The motion was opposed by Soviet Russia and Afghanistan, but the U.S. motion was passed by a vote of 37 to 19 and 21 abstentions. The Soviet and Bulgarian delegates pursued the chairman that it was improper to allow only the South Korean delegate to speak in the Committee. But getting overruled, Soviet Russia and many other delegations walked out of the meeting and the South Korean delegate made his speech.

North Korean Reply. The Political Committee's debate on the Korean Question was resumed in the afternoon meeting of Dec. 19 after completion of discussion on the Algerian issue. The discussion was centered on the Dec. 13th North

Korean reply to the Secretary General in regards to the invitation sent in accords with the Political Committee resolution. The North Korean Foreign Minister's reply stated that "the unjust resolution on the conditional participation in the Korean debate was again forced through by indispicable maneuver of the United States." He rapped that such was "an unjustified act entirely contrary to the principles of the U.N." and charged that although the Korean Question, from its origin, should not be discussed by the United Nations, North Korea should be allowed to participate in the Korean debate inasmuch the issue is being discussed therein. And the minister concluded that North Korea will not accept any resolution of Korea adopted without the participation of North Korea.

In view of the reply, the Polish delegate demanded that North Korea be invited to participate in the debate at once. But Greece which had presented the amendment inviting North Korea conditionally, opposed Poland on ground that the North Korean reply had not fulfilled the conditions attached to the invitation and charged that there were no need of inviting North Korea. To this, Soviet Russia countered that North Korea should be invited since it has declared to abide by the U.N. Charter and proposed postponement of discussions on the Korean Question until the resumed session of the Assembly in order to allow North Korea time to send its delegation. The motion was backed by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and others but meeting opposition by the United States, Philippines, Thailand, Nationalist China etc., it was rejected by a vote of 20 to 41 and 41 abstentions.

U.S. Motion Withdrawing N. Korean Invitation. In the evening meeting, the U.S. delegate presented a motion to reject the qualification of the North Korean delegation to participate in the Korean debate. The Polish delegate contented that decision on the U.S. motion must require two-

thirds majority since it requested alteration of a decision already passed by the Committee. Nevertheless, the chairman overruled the contention and the motion was put to vote, and getting passed, the problem of inviting North Korea backtracked to its starting point.

Nothing New on Substantial Matters. The Political Committee finally got done with the issue of Korean invitation and it went into discussion on the substance of the Korean Question. There were 3 draft resolutions dealing with the substance of the Question before the Committee. The first was the Mongolian proposal demanding the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea. Second was the Soviet draft resolution requesting abolishment of the UNCUR Kand lastly the 15 Korean War partner nation's draft resolution recommending continuance of the UNCURK's works.

These draft resolutions except for the slight differences in the wording and the

sponsoring nations, were the same old rehashed proposals submitted each and every year. Discussions on these proposals took place in the Committee's meeting on the morning and afternoon of Dec. 20, but nothing new developed except that the Soviet delegate denounced the military government that emerged in South Korea in May and also the defense which the Western nations put in for that government.

The usual votes were taken, whereby the 15-nation Western draft resolution alone was approved by a vote of 55 to 11 with 10 abstentions, 1 non-participation and 17 absent and sent to the General Assembly which adopted the resolution with a vote of 61 to 11 with 27 abstentions. The difference in the vote breakdown between the Political Committee and the Assembly was due to the voting changes by those members which had abstained or absented themselves from the voting in the Political Committee.

IV Distortion of Korean Question

U.N.: Not Proper Body to Solve Korean Question. Now what exactly is indicated by the past 15 years' history of the Korean Question in the U.N. and the treatment of the Question by the 16th General Assembly sessions?

The East-West cold war and the conflicting interests of United States and Soviet Russia in Korea have been given as the basic reasons why the Korean Question has been left unsolved throughout the years. And it is said that the actual situation is reflected in the United Nations. But, even if the deadlock in the Korean Question is due to the East-West cold war or U.S. vs. Soviet rivalry, that does not offer justification for leaving the Korean Question unsettled nor does it serve as an excuse to bind the question to the United Nations and have it endurge in fruitless debates forever. The point will be ever clear when we take into view the

process of settlements of other post-war international issues and also the character of the U.N. as a body to settle international disputes.

There, in fact, were a number of international disputes connected with the U.S. vs. Soviet rivalry that has been settled. Such complicated issues as the Austrian neutralization problem was settled back in 1955, while just recently, the East and West reached settlement on the Laos neutralization and unification issue. And it should be noted that these issues were resolved outside the United Nations.

The Korean Question has been an international problem much older than these issues. The Allied powers including the United States and Soviet Russia had agreed during World War II that Korea would be given its independence. The question of Korean independence then was presented as early as 1947 to the

United Nations just born to settle international disputes by peaceful means. But to this day, the Korean issue still remains unsettled. These facts are more than enough to show that the United Nations is not a proper body to resolve the Korean Question and also that the Korean Question was prolonged its settlement just because it was carried into the United Nations.

Violation of the Charter. Let us once again return to the starting point of the Korean Question in the United Nations and review its relationship with the U.N. as well as the way in which it has been treated by that organization.

Although agreement on Korean independence was not to be gained easily between U.S. and Soviet Russia in the negotiations held in the Joint Commission set up by the Dec. 1945 Tri-partite Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference, it was an obvious violation of the Charter that the 2nd General Assembly took up the work to resolve the Korean Question in defiance of the Joint Commission.

The Article 107 of the Charter stipulates: "Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the government having responsibility for such action." As shown by the chapter (XVII) heading it comes under, this Article 107 was provided as a "transitional security arrangement". Still it is one sound article in the Charter. So, the Korean Question, as long it implies the north and southern areas of the Korean peninsula divided and occupied by the U.S. and Soviet Russia as results of the War, is not a problem, by nature, to be settled by the United Nations.

Moreover, no matter how hard the United Nations may have tried, it was beyond the capacity of the United Nations to settle the Question, for if either the U.S. or Soviet Russia opposed any of its decisions,

the only way by which to attain ultimate settlement would have been to subdue the other by force, but the U.N. Charter does allow the use of such force and as it was only three years since the War ended, neither the U.S. nor Soviet Russia was in a position to use force on the other.

Distortion of U.N. Resolutions. Then it must be said that the charge at that time denouncing the presentation of the Korean Question to the United Nations as a move to shift the blame of the continued division of Korea to the United Nations instead of seeking resolution of the Question, was well-founded. Moreover, it is a clear fact that the Korean Question was distorted in the United Nations debate in such a way to serve the political interests of the Big Powers which in time, ensued distortions of the U.N. objectives as well its managing principles. The following are examples in this line:

(1) Separate Elections in South Korea. First is the separate elections held only in South Korea under the supervision of the United Nations in 1948. As described above, the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea established by the General Assembly resolution of Nov. 14, 1947, was unable to enter North Korea due to Soviet rejection. After consultation with the Interim Committee, the Commission enforced elections only in South Korea, whereby the government of the Republic of Korea holding jurisdiction over only South Korea was established.

The above General Assembly resolution (no. 112, Capt. B, par. 2) provided that elections be held under the observation of the Temporary Commission to choose "representatives, constituting a National Assembly, who may establish a National Government" and did not say anything about elections only in South Korea. And as regards consultation with the Interim Committee, it was limited to the application of the resolution only, and no reference was made therein about changing the contents of the resolution. (ibid. chap. B par. 5)

So, the enforcement of the general elections only in South Korea apparently violated the decision of the General Assembly resolution and, as a matter of fact Canada and Australia, who were members of the Temporary Commission, expressed opposition to the measure. But, in spite of its clear violation of the resolution and its damaging effects on Korean unification (that is solution of the Korean Question), the measure was pushed through in the name of the United Nations.

(2) **Approval of 16-Nation Report.** Second example was the General Assembly action on Dec. 11, 1954 which approved the report from the 16 Nations of the U.N. Forces to Korea on the closing of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, whereby the Korean Question became tightly deadlocked by being forever tied to the United Nations.

The Korean Armistice Agreement signed between the 16 Nations of the U.N. Forces on the one side and North Korea and Communist China on the other, recommended that the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean Question be decided on at a political conference of a higher level represented by both sides (Armistice Agreement par. 60) and also stipulated

that any revision or supplement on the terms of the Agreement required the mutual agreement of the commanders of both sides (ibid. par. 61) and also that the terms of the agreement should remain in force until substituted by revision or supplement accepted by both sides or by proper agreements reached at the political conference of a higher level represented by both sides. (ibid. par. 62)

The Korean Armistice Agreement including these provisions was approved by the General Assembly through its resolution on Aug. 28, 1953. Then, it should be reasoned that the Armistice Agreement and this U.N. resolution had invalidated all other U.N. resolutions and measures on Korea and also that the UNCURK lost its legal basis of existence. Nevertheless, the United Nations ignored the Armistice Agreement and the General Assembly resolution (no. 711) within a year's time and snatched the Korean Question back to itself. The reason given for the action was that Communist opposition at the conference table of the Geneva Political Conference had undermined the prospects of resolving the Korean Question. Was it then solvable by returning the Question to the United Nations? The atmosphere of the Political Conference had denied any such chances.

V Unilateral Breakup of Geneva Conference

16-Nation Declaration Closing Geneva Talks. The 16 Nations of the U.N. Forces to Korea declared in their declaration of unilaterally closing the Korean Political Conference: "The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain agreement. The principal issues, between us, therefore, are clear. Firstly, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations itself as a tool of aggression. Were we to accept this

position of the Communists, it would mean the death of the principle of collective security and of the U.N. itself. Secondly, we desire genuinely free elections. The Communists insist upon procedures which would make genuinely free elections impossible. It is clear that the Communists will not accept impartial and effective supervision of free elections.... In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable,

further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose." (16-Nation Declaration at the close of the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference, June 15, 1954)

Questionable Points: (1) Insistence on U.N. Authority. The first questionable point was the assertion that the Communists repudiated and rejected the authority and competence of the United Nations. It would be agreeable to say in general that the authority of the United Nations should be respected. But it was not proper nor relevant that the 16 Nations of the U.N. Forces to Korea brought the matter of U.N. authority and competence forcefully into the negotiating tables of the Geneva Political Conference, for the convening of the Political Conference was agreed on in the Korean Armistice Agreement signed by both the 16 Nations of the U.N. Forces and the Communists and not a single word about the authority and competence of the U.N. in dealing with the Korean Question was mentioned in that Agreement by which the Political Conference was convened.

And furthermore, if the U.N. authority and competence assertedly symbolized by the U.N. forces participated by the 16 nations preceded the Armistice Agreement, the Korean Question should have been handled by the United Nations itself as up to then, and there was certainly no use of going through the complexity of holding a political conference on the issue. So, the main reason why the 16 Nations of the U.N. Forces to Korea raised this matter of U.N. authority and competence at the Geneva Political Conference was to make a try at restoring, through employment of the good name of the United Nations, their prestige which had been cut down by the Armistice Agreement to the position of equal opponents in a war. The move, therefore, was not based on any real intentions to resolve the Korean Question.

Withdrawal of U.N. Forces after Com-

unist Forces. Another issue related to the authority and competence of the U.N. was the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Korea. Here again the 16 Nations charged that the Communist demand to withdraw all foreign armed forces from Korea prior to the all-Korea elections for unification was a denial of the authority and competence of the U.N. and demanded that the Communist forces should withdraw prior to the elections; whereas the U.N. forces would remain until establishment of a united Korean government. In view of the fact that the U.N. Forces to Korea were but opponents in the Korean War and the other party concerned in the Armistice Agreement, this attitude of the 16 Nations of the U.N. Forces to Korea brought only confusion to the issue.

(2) Insistence on U.N. Supervision. The second questionable point was the charge that while the 16 nations desired genuinely free elections, the Communists insisted upon procedures which would make genuinely free elections impossible.

As well-known, the North Korean delegation to the Geneva Political Conference, proposed at the very beginning of the conference, free general elections for Korean unification to be held simultaneously throughout North and South Korea. As East Germany had been stubbornly refusing free general elections for German reunification, the North Korean proposal was not only a complete surprise to the world but it was welcomed from all quarters as a big step forward brightening the road to Korean unification. Swift agreement thus was reached between the 16 Nations and the Communists on holding all-Korea free elections and the two parties even decided on the method and date of the elections.

But, when it came to the problem of elections supervision, the Communists refused the formula of U.N. supervision of the elections on ground that impartiality could not be expected as the U.N. side was an opponent in the War, and demand-

ed that the elections be supervised by neutral nations that did not participate in the War. The 16 Nations persisted in U.N. supervision and, after all, used the stalemate on this issue as their pretext to break the conference up. These nations, as a matter of fact, did not give a word of explanation as to why "supervision of the election by neutral countries" that the Communists proposed, was "procedures which would make genuinely free elections impossible, nor why elections supervised by the United Nations which was an opponent in the War, would be "an impartial and effective supervision of free elections".

The Communists (Chinese Premier Chou En-lai on June 5, 1954) put in a compromise and suggested they could agree to unification elections supervised by the standing armistice observation committee. But, despite the fact that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, constituted by Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia did not say that the Commission could not supervise the elections and also the fact that Great Britain and other powers of the 16 Nations presented "international supervision" plans (British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on May 13) the Communist proposal was buried asunder to the suspicion of the world.

(3) Unilateral Breakup of the Conference. The third questionable point was that the 16 Nations decided that

"further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose" and broke up the talks.

It was on April 26, 1954 that the Geneva Political Conference was commenced and June 15 that the 16 Nations issued their declaration to close the conference. The conference, therefore, was in session for about 50 days, during which time, 15 plenary sessions were held. Considering the short period and the limited number of plenary sessions, the results attained at the Geneva Political Conference were remarkable. And in the light of the fact that it took 300 sessions of talks to arrive at an agreement on Austrian neutralization, the Geneva Political Conference on Korea, which was the only ground to negotiate with the Communists who are the other party concerned in the Korean Question, should have been continued.

As reported by the Asahi Shimbun on June 5, 1954, the 16 Nations however, urged by U.S. maneuvering unilaterally broke up the conference against demands by British Commonwealth nations to continue the talks and entrusted the Korean Question to the U.N. where it was all clear that settlement was impossible. Not a sign of real intention to settle the Korean Question was discernible there and it must be said that the Korean Question was sacrificed at the altar of the United Nations for the sake of quenching the thirsty interests of certain Big Powers.

VI "American Item"

The Korean Question is held up in the United Nations not to be settled there but only to be used as a tool to serve the Big Powers. This is most clearly shown by the activities of the UNCURK and the annual U.N. Korean debates.

UNCURK: Covering up for Rulers. Eleven UNCURK annual reports (excluding those of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea and the U.N. Commission on Korea) have been submitted to the

General Assembly up to the last session. Besides those reports involving the April Revolution of 1960 and the military coup d'état of 1961, the contents of the reports were always the same and the UNCURK always defended the ROK government.

The Syngman Rhee regime, which was notorious the world-over for its old-fashioned despotism, ruled the land for 12 long years. And during the time, representative government existed only in

name. Outrages inconceivable in democratic societies were committed by that regime and for which account, it bought the scorn of the world.

In spite of these outrages, the UNCURK whose task is to "observe the development of representative government elected by the freely expressed will of the people", not only refrained from taking any rectifying measures against the outrages but it, instead, worked to cover up for the Rhee regime in its annual report to the General Assembly. The attitude was charged as beyond comprehension.

U.S. Tool. Yet, much more astounding cases were in store. The UNCURK's prime task is to promote unification and "facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea". Still, it did not even express concern over the suppression done by the ROK government authorities on the peaceful unification movement. And when the Sygman Rhee Government murdered Cho Bong-Am, the foremost leader of the ROK peaceful unification movement and two-time presidential rival to Rhee, on false charges in July 1959, the UNCURK just looked away. For these accounts the UNCURK has been looked upon as a tool of the United States and the attitude taken by the Commission in the days following the military coup d'etat last year is more than enough to back up the view.

The May 16 coup d'etat last year was a deplorable incident in which South Korean military men under U.N. Command, overthrew by force the government established through elections based on the freely expressed will of the people and recognized by the U.N. as the lawful government of Korea. The UNCURK, therefore, should have requested the U.N. forces in Korea to take such measures to restore things to the original state and reported the exact situation to the General Assembly to receive instructions.

1962 Report: Defense of Military Gov. Let us see how the UNCURK reported on

its activities and views in relation to the coup d'etat in its annual report submitted to the General Assembly on Sept. 11, and also its supplementary report submitted on Dec. 6 last year.

The report, as usual, was composed of four chapters: (I) The Commission and the Committee (II) Korean Question, (III) Representative Government and the Republic of Korea and (IV) Economic Situation and Prospects in the Republic of Korea.

In Chapter I, the UNCURK, instead of ignoring the military government, requested cooperation of that government in order to execute its tasks entrusted,

In Chapter II, the Commission did not say a word about the ruthless suppression by the military regime on the peaceful unification movement in South Korea nor was a word mentioned on the arrests of all the unificationers. But, instead, it cited the militarists' "revolutionary pledge no. 5" and expressed satisfaction in that the military government had rejected unification by force and endorsed the formula of peaceful unification through all-Korea elections supervised by the U.N. The "revolutionary pledge no. 5" which reads: "we shall strengthen our national power and determination to combat Communism, looking forward to the eventual achievement of our unchangeable goal of national unification" can be interpreted as a showdown by force but not anything promoting peaceful unification. (see One Korea, Aug. 1962). So, here the report was obviously playing up for the military government.

The leaning of the UNCURK towards the military government becomes naked in Chapter III. Here the Commission should have given its appraisal and views on the coup d'etat that destroyed the representative government of South Korea and also on the military government that emerged through the coup d'etat. Not a line, however, was spent on such and only the facts and process of the coup d'etat was reported. And as to the crackdown

carried out on the political parties resulting in tens of thousand arrests and detentions, the UNCURK dodged the matter by saying that it will give the number of arrests and the reasons of the arrests in a supplementary report.

Supplementary Report: Further Covering-up. The supplementary report, however, only classified the reasons of the arrests just as the military junta had announced and did not give the number of arrests, after all. On the contrary, the report quoted the junta's statement concerning the release of former Premier Chang Myun and his cabinet members and praised the measure as a step in the right direction.

It also cited the address by Chairman Park on United Nations Day (Oct. 24, '1961) and the diplomatic language employed in the Park-Kennedy joint communique announced in Washington on

Nov. 14 which read: "the Chairman and the President reaffirmed their faith in the United Nations, and their determination to seek reunification of Korea in freedom through peaceful means under the principles laid down and reaffirmed by the U.N. General Assembly", and said that these were "significant actions". And as to the suppression of peaceful unificationers, it finally did not spare a word.

"American Item". As such is the work which the UNCURK has been doing, now exactly for what purpose is the UNCURK stationed to Korea? And furthermore, a lot of precious time is being spent by the General Assembly each year in discussing the UNCURK reports. It, therefore, is no wonder that the item "Korean Question" involving the UNCURK report which comes up each and every year in the General Assembly agenda, is being charged as an "American Item".

VII Contempt of U.N.

U.N. Debate: Contempt of U.N. Let us next observe how the U.N. debate on the Korean Question have been held. Up to the last session, discussions on the issue have been centered on the UNCURK annual report. Western nations have always approved the reports and proposed continuance of its work; whereas the Communists have always demanded abolishment of the UNCURK as well as with drawal of all foreign armed forces from South Korea. There would be heated exchange of arguments and then votes, whereby the Western resolution would be adopted. Such has been the routine.

A grave problem lies here. The United Nations is a world body dedicated to settle international disputes through peaceful means. So, its resolutions on the disputes must take opposite views into consideration and, once adopted, the resolutions should bring settlement to the disputes. In other words, the United Nations is not a "ground for resolution" but must be a "ground for settlement."

Thus, it must be said that the East and West camps are holding the United Nations in contempt, for they have been presenting proposals after proposals merely for the sake of propaganda and especially in the case of the Korean Question, they have been passing the same ineffective resolutions each and every year, of which the resolutions on Korean invitation has been the most noisy.

Invitation Issue. The proposal to invite both North and South Korean representatives, the parties concerned in the Korean Question, was first presented to the 3rd General Assembly session. At this 3rd session, which convened in Sept. 1948 following the establishment of the ROK government through the elections held only in South Korea, Czechoslovakia presented a draft resolution requesting invitation of North Korean representatives also to the U.N. Korean debate. Meeting opposition from the U.S. and other Western nations as well as Nationalist China, the, proposal, however was re-

jected by a vote of 6 to 34 and 8 abstentions.

In the following 4th session, Soviet Russia proposed inviting North Korea and even countries like France and Syria, who had participated as members in the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea, proposed inviting North Korea provided it "recognized the U.N. Commission on Korea" or as "individuals". This indicated that even members within the Western bloc thought it unjust to refuse North Korean participation in the U.N. Korean debate.

This unjust measure denying North Korean participation was forced through the 4th session too. This was contrary to the purpose of the U.N. defined in Article 1 par. 2 of the Charter "to develop friendly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of the peoples." Thus North Korea was shut out from all grounds of international negotiations and the internationally assured negotiating channels between North and South Korea was closed up too. If road was left open for North Korea to participate in the U.N. discussions, it can even be said that the Korean War could have been evaded. At any rate, unjustly and unfortunately, proposals to invite North Korean representatives were destined to be rejected in all the subsequent Assembly sessions.

U.S. Crafty Maneuver. However, with the increase of Afro-Asian members in the U.N., the margin in the voting narrowed each year and, in the 15th session, the United States, figuring it no longer possible to stop North Korean participation, put forth a surprise compromise motion to invite North Korea on condition that it "accepts the authority and competence of the U.N. in Korea". The motion was not presented out of any intention to find a breakthrough in the stalemate. As informed sources pointed out at that time, the real aim of the U.S. motion was, on the contrary, to stop the participation of North Korea. The intention of the U.S. maneuver was soon

to be revealed.

Although the U.S. motion was passed by the 15th session, discussions on the Korean Question were cut off as time ran out and postponed till the 16th General Assembly session. But, by the time the next 16th Assembly entered its discussions on the Question, the U.S. had changed its position. It proposed to invite only South Korea to the U.N. debate. As described before, the U.S. proposal couldn't get enough support even from the Western powers and the Greece-Thailand amendment inviting North Korea also on condition that it clearly accept the authority and competence of the U.N. in dealing with the Korean Question, was adopted by the Assembly's Political Committee. So, what the U.S. did was to find fault with the North Korean reply to the U.N. invitation and by back-the-scenes maneuvering, got the Political Committee to withdraw the invitation to North Korea.

Faults in North Korean Reply. Of course, it was not right that North Korea, through anger, put in such charges as "unjust resolution on the conditional participation in the Korean debate was again forced through by despicable maneuver of the United States" or "such was a shameful act entirely contrary to the principles of the U.N." at the beginning of its reply. North Korea could have raised such charges at the table of discussions.

What was more incomprehensible than the North Korean attitude was the fact that the invitation to North Korea, once decided on, had to be withdrawn. The North Koreans had, in advance of the U.N. Korean debate, sent messages to the Assembly President and the Secretary General requesting participation of North Korean representatives in the General Assembly's discussions on the Korean Question. And in its reply to the U.N. invitation, North Korea made clear its intention to participate and also reconfirmed its respect for the U.N. Charter.

Unreasonable Withdrawal of Invitation. Since such was the North Korean atti-

tude, it was quite unreasonable that the invitation to North Korea was withdrawn merely on ground that the wording "North Korea will not recognize any resolution adopted by the U.N. on the Korean Question without the participation of North Korean; rejected the conditions attached to the invitation. So long as the party concerned in the issue requests participation in the U.N. discussions, it implies that that party accepts the authority of the U.N. To attach conditions, therefore, is an act contrary to the principles of the U.N. And if to "clearly accept the authority and competence of the U.N. in dealing with Korean Question" must be the acceptance and respect for all

the U.N. resolutions on Korea, such is a condition fully ignorant of or craftily neglecting the past history of the Korean Question in the United Nations.

As pointed out above, it was already a violation of Article 107 of the Charter that the Korean Question was taken up by the U.N. As Koreans did not participate, all the U.N. resolutions on Korea were departures from the principle of self-determination. These resolutions, moreover, were reversed, altered and distorted. Thus, it must be concluded that the continued refusal of North Korean participation in the U.N. Korean debate was an act ill-using the United Nations and damaging to its authority.

VIII Way to Promote U.N. Authority

What measures, then, should be taken to restore and promote U.N. authority in dealing with the Korean Question?

Invite Both North and South Korean Representatives

First of all, the General Assembly must invite North Korean as well as South Korean representatives to its Korean debate. For this, the Assembly must refrain from repeating the foolish act of attaching conditions and instead display, both in name and reality, that it is a "center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends" (U.N. Charter, Art. 1, par. 4) and a world body dedicated to settle international disputes through peaceful means. Although it will be interesting to hear the North Korean view on the issue, participation of North Korea will not bring about an abrupt settlement. So, in order to attain swift solution of the problem, the Assembly should take the following measures:

Convene an International Conference of Nations Concerned

Firstly the Assembly should, through resolution, convene an International Con-

ference of the Nations Concerned in the Korean Question. The conference could be constituted by the nations that participated in the 1954 Geneva Political Conference on Korea or possibly with countries like India added by agreement. The conference must inherit the agreements reached at the Geneva Conference and be continued until final settlement is reached on the formula of Korean unification.

Plan to hold international conference of the nations concerned was, in fact, proposed by Indonesia in the last session and India too has suggested such plan. But, the U.S., as in the occasion of the Geneva Conference, has expressed opposition to such parley and South Korea is dead against any international conference.

It must be noted that an international conference is the only ground where peaceful settlement can be reached with the Communists on the issue. And to convene such conference, which virtually would be continuance of the Geneva Conference, is to reconfirm the Korean Armistice Agreement and the U.N. resolution of Aug. 28, 1953. The adoption by the Assembly of a resolution to convene

an International Conference of Nations Concerned will ensure adherence to the principles of the U.N., and also respect of the General Assembly resolution as well as the international agreement.

Replace U.N. Forces in Korea with International Security Force

Secondly, the Assembly, through resolution, should withdraw the U.N. Forces in Korea and, in turn, form and despatch an International Security Force. This force shall be placed under the command of the U.N. Secretary General and stationed in Korea during such period to be decided on by the International Conference.

Soviet Russia, by the way, has presented a draft resolution requesting withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from South Korea to the current Assembly session. In principle, it may be agreeable

to have all foreign armed forces to evacuate Korea since the present U.N. Forces stationed in Korea constituted mostly by U.S. forces, were opponents in the Korean War and constituting one source of the tensions in the Korean peninsula. But when the present situation is considered, withdrawal of foreign force will not necessarily bring immediate realization of Korean unification. As North and 1,600,000 men are confronting one another, there lie dangers of large-scaled collision breaking out, if proper check is not put on these forces.

So, it should be the first job of the U.N. to form and despatch an International Security Force that will ease the tensions in the Korean Peninsula by replacing the present U.N. Forces in Korea as well as prevent collision between the armies of North and South Korea by holding them in check.

IX Conclusion

We have thus reviewed the past history of the Korean Question in the United Nations, appraised the actions taken by that body and the measures the U.N. should take in order to settle the problem.

The Korean Question should be dealt by the United Nations so as to put an end to the division of the Korean territory and nation that has been the source of all the miseries of Koreans and pave the way to Korean unification.

Unfortunately, the Korean Question has been ill-used to serve the interests of the Big Powers for which account, unification has been prolonged forever.

But the cause of such can be attributed to the past faults in the management of the United Nations. The increase in its membership of newly born nations freshly liberated from colonial rule, is changing the U.N. from a body exploited by the

Big Powers into a real guardian of world peace.

The United Nations is a world body which the entire humanity, regardless of race, nationality, political creed or religious faith, must cooperate to nurture. And to promote its authority, the idea and maneuvering to get things passed by the rule of majority must be restrained and real solution following the lofty purposes and principles of the Charter must be worked out for the issues before it one by one and the Korean Question must not be left an exception.

It is the sincere wish of Koreans that all U.N. member nations and both North and South Korean governments will recall the innate mission of the United Nations and also the essentials of the Korean Question and take up the proposals above to attain a real settlement on the Korean Unification Question.

South Korea Agrees to All-Korea Olympic Team

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) Chancellor Otto Mayer announced on Aug. 21 that the (South) Korea Olympic Committee (KOC) agreed in principle to form an all-Korea team with North Korea for the 1964 Olympic Games. The report was confirmed by the KOC on the following day by a communique which assured formation of a united Korea Olympic team to take part in the 18th Tokyo Olympics on condition that the ROK flag and national anthem be used.

The IOC had decided in its June general meeting in Moscow that North and South Korea should send a united team to the 1964 games. To this recommendation, North Korea immediately expressed compliance but South Korea reluctant to form an all-Korea team, delayed reply and the IOC set Sept. 1 as deadline for South Korea to make clear its attitude.

Before South Korea arrived at the affirmative decision, the atmosphere was against a united team. Brig. Gen. Shon Chang-Kyu, chairman of the Supreme Council's education-social committee said on June 5 that "South Korea would never form an all-Korea team comprising athletes now residing in North Korea. This is the unchangeable basic policy of our government." Then on June 8 Supreme Council vice chairman Lee Joo-Il stated that South Korea could not accept the recommendation. Final decision, however was up to the KOC.

So, the affirmative reply to the IOC was

an abrupt turnabout in the military government's attitude. The government apparently weighed the blame and public indignation it must take on if South Korea should be shut out from all international athletic meets for refusing the IOC recommendation.

The KOC, in its communique, said that "the KOC hopes formation of a South-North team will be realized shortly so that Korean youths will be able to demonstrate the power of Korea through international sports." The communique then asserted that "KOC became a member of the IOC in 1947 and has participated in the international games since then. However, the North Korea Communists have been spreading propaganda even on the subject of sports."

The military government which dislikes any contact with North Korea is expected to persist in the conditions involving the flag and national anthem. The KOC turned down the North Korean call on July 29 suggesting talks between both Olympic Committees at Panmunjom, and stated that any decision on the united Korean team must be negotiated through the International Olympic Committee. The stubborn attitude is contrasting to that of North Korea which has welcomed the South Korean acception of the IOC recommendation. But, as there are precedents like all-German teams, it is expected that an all-Korea team will come into being after all.

Notice

One Korea No. 15 was published as Sept. ~ Oct. combined issue.

Correction

Please correct 3 million tons of farm goods on Page 8, col. 2, line 23, of Aug. 1962 One Korea, to 3 million suks. (one ton is equal to 6.3 suks)

ROK REFUGEES IN JAPAN STRUGGLE

For International Status

ROK political refugees in Japan who face dangers of getting expatriated to dictator-ruled South Korea have formed a committee to obtain for themselves the internationally recognized status and protection of refugees. The committee has appealed to the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees to seek a just settlement of the problem.

Inauguration of Refugees' Committee.

On August 20, a group of ROK political refugees residing in Japan gathered in Tokyo to set up a "Committee for ROK Political Refugees in Japan." The Committee's objective is to work to attain the justful rights and improve the livelihood and status of ROK political and ordinary refugees living in Japan. These persons have sought refugee in Japan because of the dangers of receiving persecution if they return to South Korea. The Committee's immediate work, therefore is to (1) stop the Japanese government from expatriating South Koreans in Japan compulsorily; (2) secure the internationally offered status, treatment and protection for ROK refugees in Japan; and (3) oppose the ROK and Japanese governments to use the ROK refugees as implements of international politics.

The Committee at once requested the Japanese government and other organizations to consider this heretofore neglected problem. The Japanese Socialist Party raised the question in the August 23 House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee and an extensive debate ensued.

The Committee further solicited cooperation of the local Korean community, the Japanese public and foreign authorities concerned. And in view of the negative attitude of the Japanese government, it has sent appeals to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees and the International Red Cross requesting these organizations to take immediate actions to relieve these stranded Koreans in

Japan.

World-wide Relief for Refugees. Relief for refugees of war and political unrest became an urgent and important international problem after the World War II which brought about the establishment of the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees. By Jan. 1, 1951, the High Commissioner already announced that 2,100,000 refugees had been put under his care. In the Statute concerning U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees, refugees are defined as: "those persons who, owing to the well-founded fear of persecution for reason of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, are outside their country of origin and cannot or owing to such fear, do not wish to avail themselves of the protection of that country."

The High Commissioner, in cooperation with the states concerned, promotes voluntary repatriation, resettlement, integration of refugees; recommends ratification of the July 1951 International Convention for Status of Refugees and supervises the application of the Convention. This Convention, in line with the spirit of the 1948 International Declaration of Human Rights, ensures refugees equal treatment in their residential state, as the nationals of that state. It particularly stipulates that no government shall punish illegal entrants or residents when they have justful reasons of leaving their country of origin, and also that they must not be expatriated to their country of origin when their lives and freedom will be endangered.

Through the World Refugee Relief Program carried out by the United Nations from 1954 to 58, 45,000 refugees living in concentration camps were resettled in such countries as the United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Israel and Chile. These refugees were mainly Europeans; whereas refugee work in Asia was neglected until 1957 when the High Commissioner extended relief work to the Chinese mainland refugees in Hongkong.

In the meantime, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the World Refugee Year in 1958 to step up the world-wide refugee relief programs and Japan was one of the first nations to express support to this project.

Inhumane Attitude of Japanese Government. In reality, however, the Japanese government has not abided by such program or international conventions and has taken inhumane actions against ROK refugees. It has treated ROK refugees as illegal entrants, placed them in concentration camps and expatriated them. The number of these Koreans expatriated during 1946 to 1960 totalled 63,750 persons.

Moreover, once their residential terms expire, ROK students studying in Japan are being given notice to repatriate despite the political situation in South Korea forbids them to return. Most ROK students in Japan have opposed and fought against the military regime and when sent back they apparently must face persencution.

Then there are those Korean who must break up their family when ordered to expatriate. The Japanese government, as a matter of fact, is obliged by the 1957 resolution of the International Red Cross Meeting to help reunion of dispersed families despite its member or members are illegal entrants. But the Japanese government has been ignoring this principle too.

Diet Debate and Appeal to High Commissioner. ROK residents in Japan have been constantly charging the inhumane

attitude of the Japanese government but to no avail. The problem, however, has finally been brought out into the foreground. The issue of ROK refugees in Japan was taken up by the recent session of the Japanese Diet. On August 23, Socialist Representatives Kanemitsu Hososako and Haruo Okada questioned the government in the House Foreign Relations Committee, whether ROK refugees and political exiles were being given the same treatment as those from other countries. To this, Foreign Minister Ohira replied that the government's attitude is to be impartial.

On the following day, Socialist Representative Kozo Inomata charged in the House Justice Committee that the government was sending back ROK students to South Korea where they might be persecuted by the military regime. He emphasized that most of the ROK students studying in Japan were supporters off peaceful unification and, therefore, opposed to the Park Chung-Hee regime. And as peaceful unificationists are being met with servere punishments, the Japanese government would be trampling on the International Declaration of Human Rights if it should go on sending these students back, the Sosialist argued. He then demanded that the government to invite the U.N. High Commissioner to look into the matter.

In reply to the query, government officials including Justice Minister Nakagaki stated the government would respect the international conventions on refugee relief ond abide by humane standpoint, but in the case of ROK citizens and students in Japan, the officials said, they must be treated case by case instead of generally as refugees.

In view of the negative attitude of the Japanese government, the Committee for ROK Political Refugees in Japan decided to appeal to the U.N. High Commissioner and the International Red Cross in order to seek a just settlement.

PROCLAMATION

Inaugurating Committee for ROK Political Refugees in Japan (Aug. 20, 1962)

The division of Korea, the subsequent Korean War, the long years of atrocious administrations and the frequent changes of government have caused a great number of Republic of Korea citizens to leave their country of origin and seek refugee in its nearest neighbor Japan.

These South Koreans apparently come under the universally accepted category of "refugees" defined as "those persons who, owing to the well-founded fear of persecution for reason of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, are outside their country of origin and cannot—or owing to such fear, do not wish to avail themselves of the protection of that country," in the "Constitution of International Refugees Organization" which was adopted by the United Nations on February 15, 1946 and laid the foundation for a worldwide refugee relief program.

This program was further strengthened by the "Statute concerning United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees" adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 24, 1950 and the "Convention relating to the Status of Refugees" signed by 26 Nations on June 18, 1951 and ratified to date by 34 nations.

In the past the Spanish Republican Refugees who left their country after the establishment of the Franco regime, were given due protection by their residential states, so were the Hungarian refugees recently and countless other refugees as well.

We, therefore, believe that ROK refugees too should be offered, in accord with the spirit of the above convention and statute, the same protection as these refugees by the residential state. Protection and relief for refugees have become a major problem of the world. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees was set up in the United Nations on Jan. 1, 1951 and following the international convention, the residential state of refugees, not only approves the residence of refugees within its territories but also offers refugees equal treatment with its own citizens in relation to housing, employment, education, social relief etc., and when

refugees travel overseas, it provides such facilities as issuing of travel documents, reunion of dispersed members of family, etc.

So, regardless of ratification of the international convention and treaty concerning refugees, all states must assume the obligation to offer the internationally accepted treatment to those refugees residing within its territories and Japan is no exception. As a matter of fact, Japan was one of the first nations to support the "World Refugees' Year" which was established by the U.N. General Assembly in November 1958 with the purpose to promote international concern toward the refugee problem and to step up refugee relief. And since Japan is participating in the program along with 96 other countries, she cannot neglect devising relief for refugees.

Nevertheless, the Japanese Government, instead of offering relief to South Korean political refugees residing in Japan, have treated these refugees as illegal entrants or illegal residents and enforced measures of expatriation on them. The measure, moreover, is being strengthened and, for which sake, ROK refugees in Japan are at a complete loss; for they must either choose between returning to their country of origin now being terrorized by an atrocious dictatorship or seek refugee in a third country without the resources of maintaining a livelihood there. This inhumane treatment of South Korean refugees by the Japanese Government goes against the spirit and resolution of the United Nations and also against the international concept and practice. Such cannot be let by in the international society of today. The incomparable anxiety and insecure position of ROK refugees in Japan must not be neglected another day.

Feeling deep indignation toward the unjust treatment of South Korean refugees by the Japanese Government, we concerned for the interests of South Korean refugees in Japan, have gathered to establish a "Committee for Republic of Korean Political refugees in Japan" which will work to realize the following demands. (cont. on page 23)

ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION TALKS

Sinister Aims of Both Governments

The ROK military regime and the Japanese government are both hurrying to reach a rapprochement. While the ROK military regime is in desperate need of foreign currency, Japan's motive is to make an early economic penetration into South Korea.

Ikeda's Earnestness. Preliminary negotiations of the ROK Japan normalization talks were resumed on August 21 after 5 months' recess following "political talks" between ROK Foreign Minister Choi Duk-Shin and his Japanese counterpart Zentaro Kosaka last March. The current Tokyo negotiations are being held as preparatory talks to pave the way for another regular political talks.

Premier Hayato Ikeda of Japan, who completed his Cabinet reshuffle following the House of Councillors elections in July, seems very eager to reach an early rapprochement. Besides being pressured by domestic and foreign circles, Ikeda's eagerness is apparently based on the calculation that now is the best chance to reach a settlement so as to secure a way for economic penetration into South Korea.

\$300 million Offer. To underline his earnestness, Ikeda ordered his negotiator to present a new proposal which upped the Japanese offer to Korean property Claims to \$150 million from the long-held line of \$70 million plus another \$150 million as long-term loans.

The \$150 million is to be offered as grant-in-aid instead of compensations for the property claims, and even with the other \$150 million in loans added, it will only reach half the sum of \$600 million (\$300 million as property claims and \$300 million as grants) requested by South Korea. The \$450 million difference remaining concerning compensations and the fear towards the repulsion of national sentiment have kept the ROK mil-

itary regime from accepting the offer and the talks have come to a stalemate again.

In order to find a breakthrough, U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, Samuel D. Berger is reportedly acting as a go-between and proposed utilizing the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Area) and EROA (Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas) debts payments by Japan to the United States.

Unacceptable. Despite such attempts to get the two countries to reach a rapprochement, early settlement seems hardly possible since the biggest barrier lies more with the national sentiment of South Korea than the sum of money to be paid. ROK newspapers have been very critical. The Korea Times warned that: "the Japanese government has pursued a diplomacy involving near interests only, putting immediate gains far before long-run benefits or political principles and international faith. If we are not shrewd enough to frustrate Japanese maneuvering, we are bound to lose".

Six Series of Talks. The normalization talks have been going on and off for more than ten years. Six series of talks were held during the time. The first series of talks opened in Tokyo on Feb. 15, 1952 and was broken up on April 25 of the same year. The second series were held from Jan. 5 to July 23, 1953; third series, Oct. 6 to Oct. 21, 1953; fourth series, April 15, 1958 to April 1960; fifth series, Oct. 25, 1960 to May 1961 and sixth series from Oct. 2, 1961 up to today.

The difference between the two count-

ries have been so wide that the talks always revolved around the same arguments without hardly any progress until the frustrated negotiators had to call the talks off. The third series was called off on account of an irresponsible statement by the Japanese chief delegate Kubota who remarked that Japanese rule of Korea was beneficial to the Koreans. The fourth was disrupted by the April Revolution and the fifth by the military coup d'etat.

Wide Differences. The major points of issue in these talks have been the Korean property claims, Rhee Peace Line (fishing limits) and legal status of Koreans in Japan.

South Korea has requested that Japan should pay \$800 million (reduced to \$600 million by the military regime) for Korean property claims covering gold and silver bullions Japan removed from Korea: Japanese liabilities in Korea; unpaid wages for Korean workers drafted by Japan during the War and saving deposits by Koreans. Japan has never formally admitted these claims except those pertaining to "individuals" estimated at around 50 to 70 million dollars.

Japan has insisted on abolishing the Rhee Line which has setup wide territorial waters around Korea, while South Korea has claimed that the Line was necessary for defense and protection of marine resources. Japan has agreed to recognize permanent residential rights to Koreans who have resided in Japan from the time prior to the termination of the War but has refused such rights to those who were

born after the War. Korea has demanded that these Korean offsprings should be given permanent residential rights.

ROK Military Regime: Need of Money. The prime aim of the ROK military regime is to get the money involved. With the ROK economy in a disastrous state and the five-year economic development plan near collapse, money from Japan is, in fact, the last resource by which the militarists can expect relief. The estimated foreign investments needed for the 5-year plan is \$680 million, of which the government has secured hardly a cent although the first year of the program has gone by already. The failures in the stock market manipulation and the subsequent currency reform have practically closed all the doors for the military regime to procure investments at home. So an early rapprochement with Japan is the last means by which the militarists can make a try at getting themselves out of the economic difficulty.

Japan: Eye at Overseas Market. The Japanese government, in turn, seems to be taking advantage of the predicament of the ROK military regime and has an eye at securing South Korea as an overseas market for Japanese industries. This short-sighted attitude of the Japanese government is clearly reflected in the new proposal which seeks to defer all entangled issues to later negotiations and first of all, to realize the normalization of diplomatic relation between the two countries. This is why Japan is so eager on holding "political talks."

Proclamation (cont. from page 21)

(1) The Japanese Government shall immediately suspend expatriation of South Korean refugees in Japan.

(2) The Japanese Government shall not use South Korean refugees in Japan as implements in the political negotiations such as the ROK-Japan normalization talks for the purpose of strengthening Japan's position in the negotiations.

(3) The Japanese Government shall offer treatment to all South Korean refugees in Japan based on the international convention; and also to safeguard the rights and interests and promote improvement of living standards and status of ROK refugees in Japan.

We here solicit wide approval and support to this work.

NRM to be placed under President.

On Aug. 16, the government announced that the National Reconstruction Movement will be placed under the office of president. The Supreme Council's education and social affairs committee is studying a revision bill of the NRM law to provide a legal ground for its reorganization. Maj. Gen. Kim Yong-Sun, chairman of the committee said that decision was made in order to secure "political neutrality of the movement." He also explained that "the government policy aims to eliminate poverty and corruption, to bring about reformation of men and unification of the people's mind through the movement." Informed sources, however view the reform as move to strengthen the militarists' position in the coming elections, especially with an eye at using the movement to collect votes for Chairman Park in case he runs for the Presidency.

Chang Myun Demanded Life Imprisonment.

On Aug. 28, former Premier Chang Myun demanded life imprisonment by the prosecution of the Central Court Martial. Chang was put on trial last Aug. 16 on the charge of contributing 100,000 won (¥700) to the defunct minor party Iju-Dang as funds for its plot to overthrow the present military government. Chang testified that he did give the money only as living expenses to the party leader and contended that the prosecution's charge was an intrigue to connect him with the plotters. Following the prosecutions demand Chang was immediately arrested and whisked off to an unidentified prison. In the meantime, the 17 defendants of the Iju-Dang case were demanded sentences including 4 deaths and 13 prison terms.

Status Pact Negotiations to be Resumed on Sept. 20.

On Sept. 6, the Republic of Korea and the United States issued a joint statement announcing the resumption within the month of negotiations for an agreement on the status of American servicemen in Korea. The statement, however, made clear that the conclusion of a status pact will have to await till "restoration of civil government in South Korea" due to the constitutional changes slated for next year. Although frequent atrocities committed by U.S. servicemen for Korea nationals had incited public demand for an early conclusion of such pact, the U.S. had evaded negotiations with the military government. Compromise was reached to resume negotiations on condition that the agreement be signed "after restoration of civil government." And Foreign Minister Choi Duk-Shin said that working level talks will be opened around around Sept. 20.

Cabinet Passes 1963 National Budget Bill.

On Sept. 12, the ROK cabinet passed the national budget bill for 1963 estimate at 78,549 million won. The bill shows an increase of 4.3 billion won in its total compared with that of the current budget. The budget bill will be sent to the Supreme Council which is expected to approve it with possible revisions. A deficit of about 6.8 billion won including 4.5 billion in industrial rehabilitation bonds, 1.3 billion in loans is counted. The new budget bill provided the special account for economic development with some 24.6 billion won to be spent for the implementation of the 5-year economic development plan. Major sources of revenue will be tax income totalling 27.3 billion won and 25.3 billion from the counterpart fund.